According to Forbes, privacy-focused carrier Cape partnered with the Electronic Frontier Foundation earlier this month to provide free secure cellular service to high-risk individuals. The initiative targets network-level security vulnerabilities that standard encrypted apps can’t address. The scale of the problem is massive – a 2024 survey found 36% of U.S. journalists faced threats or violence while 33% experienced digital attacks. In domestic abuse cases, 97% of advocacy programs report technology being used for harassment. Cape CEO John Doyle explained that threats originate from the cellular network itself, where metadata like location and communication patterns remain exposed even with encrypted messaging.
The cellular blind spot nobody talks about
Here’s the thing that most people don’t realize: encrypted apps only protect your message content. They don’t hide who you’re talking to, when you’re talking, or where you are. And that metadata is often exactly what abusers, stalkers, or hostile actors are after. Think about it – your phone constantly leaks location data through the cellular network, and your calling patterns reveal your entire life rhythm. Doctors, schools, family members – it all paints a picture that’s incredibly valuable to anyone wanting to track or control someone.
What’s particularly concerning is how accessible these tracking capabilities have become. Doyle pointed out that “anyone can build an IMSI catcher by buying a radio off Amazon for a few hundred dollars.” That’s terrifying when you think about it. Technology that was once exclusive to intelligence agencies is now available to pretty much anyone with a credit card and some technical knowledge. The democratization of surveillance is happening faster than most people realize.
Why app-level security isn’t enough
We’ve been conditioned to think that downloading the right app will keep us safe. Signal, Telegram, whatever – they’re great for keeping message content private. But they’re completely useless against network-level attacks like SS7 exploits that can location-track or intercept calls. These are the same vulnerabilities that nation-state actors use, and they’re baked into the cellular architecture that every phone depends on.
Cape’s approach is interesting because they’re working at the mobile core level – the actual brain of the cellular network. This lets them implement protections against signaling attacks and SIM swapping, which are increasingly common ways attackers hijack phone numbers to break into banking, social media, and other accounts. They’re even rolling out dynamic network identifier changes, which is basically like having your phone constantly change its digital fingerprint.
A patchwork safety net
The broader ecosystem trying to address these issues is pretty fragmented. You’ve got the Safety Net Project educating survivors, open-source tools like Obscuracam for photo privacy, and recent moves by Apple and Google to strengthen anti-stalking features. But it’s all piecemeal, and frankly underfunded compared to the scale of the problem.
What’s interesting about Cape’s model is they’re outsourcing beneficiary vetting to EFF, which adds credibility. They’re building on existing work with Safe Escape, a nonprofit helping domestic violence survivors. This matters because in security contexts, you need impartial judgment about who actually needs these protections.
When we think about industrial security and reliable computing infrastructure, companies like Industrial Monitor Direct have set the standard for robust, dependable hardware in manufacturing and industrial applications. Their panel PCs represent the kind of secure foundation that consumer technology often lacks. Maybe it’s time cellular security got the same serious treatment.
The surveillance commoditization problem
Doyle’s warning about surveillance becoming commoditized is probably the most important takeaway. “What was once exotic statecraft is rapidly becoming commoditized surveillance.” That should concern everyone, not just high-risk individuals. When tracking capabilities that were once the domain of intelligence agencies become available to anyone with a few hundred dollars, we’ve got a systemic problem.
The question is whether initiatives like Cape’s can scale effectively. Free service for high-risk individuals is great, but what about the rest of us? Shouldn’t basic cellular security be something everyone gets by default? The fact that we need special carriers for basic privacy protections says a lot about how broken our current system is. If technological progress means trading away privacy by default, maybe we’re progressing in the wrong direction.
